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MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL ONE-SUBJECT RULE:
NEITHER A DEAD LETTER NOR AN UNDUE
RESTRICTION
M. Albert Figinskit
Maryland's Constitution contains constraints on the form, style,
scope, and content of legislation,' unlike the United States ConstitutAB., 1959, Johns Hopkins; LL.B., 1962, University of Maryland; LL.M., 1965,
George Washington University Law School. Member, Saul, Ewing, Weinberg &
Green. Former Associate Judge, The Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, 1980.
The Author was counsel of record in two of the cases discussed in this Article.
See generally State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 617 A2d
586 (1993); Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 568 A2d 1111 (1990).
1. The MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, provides:
The style of all Laws of this State shall be, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland:" and all Laws shall be passed by original
bill; and every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace
but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law,
nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its
title, or section only; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its
title, to grant powers, or confer rights which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act; and it shall be the duty of the General
Assembly, in amending any article, or section of the Code of Laws of
this State, to enact the same, as the said article, or section would
read when amended. And whenever the General Assembly shall enact
any Public General Law, not amendatory of any section, or article in
the said Code, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact
the same, in articles and sections, in the same manner, as the Code
is arranged, and to provide for the publication of all additions and
alterations, which may be made to the said Code.
In addition to Section 29, other sections in Article III contain limits on legislation or legislative activities. For example, Article III, Section 27 addresses
where and when bills may originate, imposes a three readings requirement,
and allows for a consent calendar. "[A] majority of the whole number of" delegates and senators is required for "final passage." MD. CONST. art. III, § 28.
"[U]nless ... otherwise expressly declared" in an enactment, laws "take effect
the first day of June next after the session at which [they are] passed." MD.
CONST. art. III, § 31. Furthermore, appropriations are strictly governed by Article III, Sections 31 and 52, and certain "local or special [l]aws" are prohibited
by Article III, Section 33. Moreover, specific constitutional provisions define
the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 40,
40A, 40B, 40C.
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tion,2 but akin to the fundamental laws of many other states. 3 Of
the several limits Maryland's Constitution places on legislation, the
most often litigated provision is Article III, Section 29, commonly
known as the "one-subject rule."4 The one-subject rule provides:
"[E]very Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but
one-subject, and that shall be described in its title . . .. "5 This twopronged provision, commanding that legislation (1) embrace a single subject, and (2) have a descriptive title, was adopted in the Maryland Constitution of 1851. 6 It has basically remained unchanged
over the years. 7
Like similar provisions in other state constitutions, the onesubject rule was intended to place a check on logrolling,8 deceptive
2. The U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, merely requires that bills "for raising Revenue,"
originate in the House of Representatives, provides for journalizing enactments, and establishes the procedure for vetoes.
3. In 1868, Thomas Cooley, a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court and a professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Michigan Law School, wrote
that Maryland was one of several states to have a provision limiting enactments to one subject articulated in the title of the bill. See THOMAS M. COOLEY,
A TREATISE ON TIlE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON TIlE LEGISlATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF TIlE AMERICAN UNION 141 nA (Da Capo Press
1972). The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that "[a]s of 1982, 'forty-one
state constitutions, provide[d] that an act shall not embrace more than one
subject or object.' " Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 399, 568 A.2d
1111, 1116 (1990) (quoting lA NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTIlERLANO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17.01 (4th ed. 1985».
4. The one-subject rule has "been construed probably more often than any
other part of the [Maryland] Constitution." Carl N. Everstine, Titles of Legislative Acts, 9 MD. L. REv. 197, 197 (1948).
5. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29.
6. See MD. CONST. of 1851 art. III, § 17. Because of the dual mandates of the onesubject rule, it would be more accurate to call it the "single-subject/descriptive-title rule." In keeping with common usage, and for purposes of brevity,
this Article refers to the rule as the "one-subject rule."
7. Minor textual changes occurred in the MD. CONST. of 1864 and MD. CONST. of
1867. See Everstine, supra note 4, at 199.
8. Logrolling is defined in Safire's Political Dictionary in the following manner:
[M]utual aid among politicians, especially legislators who must vote
on many items of economic importance in individual states and
districts.
H. L. Mencken traces the use of logrolling back to 1820. Hans
Sperber and Travis Trittschuh have tracked down derisive newspaper
comments of "great log rolling captains" in politics to 1809....
Among settlers in the wilderness, cooperation in handling logs for
land clearing and construction was a force overriding any differences
among neighbors. So too in politics. "If you will vote for my inter-
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enactments, and other legislative chicanery.9 Three years after the
Maryland Constitution of 1851 was adopted, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland explained the policy reasons for the one-subject rule in
Davis v. State. \0 The Davis court noted that the one-subject rule was
enacted to curtail the practice "of engrafting, upon subjects of great
public benefit, . . . for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often
pernicious matters."l1 The court explained that, "during the haste
and confusion always incident" to the close of legislative sessions,
statutes are often passed with provisions that few legislators would
have agreed with, or "knew anything of before" the adornments
were placed on the legislation. 12 Scholarly analysis discovered an-

9.
10.
11.
12.

est," said Congressman B. F. Butler in 1870, "I will vote for yours.
That is how these tariffs are log-rolled through."
Reformers have inveighed against the practice as assiduously as
the practitioners have pursued it. In 1871 the New York Times complained of Republicans who established "corrupt alliances with the
enemy in the way of log rolling legislation." And in 1967 Time, cataloging the problems of the Post Office-then an institution as afflicted by bad politics as any in the country-noted "construction
programs pressured on the one side by budget vagaries and on the
other by congressional log rolling." ...
The classic description of the theory of logrolling is attributed to Simon Cameron, Pennsylvania politician who served as Lincoln's first
Secretary of War: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."
WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE'S POUTICAL DICTIONARY 384-85 (1978).
See COOLEY, supra note 3, at 143-44.
7 Md. 151 (1854).
Id. at 160.
Id. The Davis court explained:
The object of this constitutional provision is obvious and highly commendable. A practice had crept into our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for
local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters, and
rather than endanger the main subject, or for the purpose of securing new strength for it, members were often induced to sanction and
actually vote for such provisions, which if they were offered as independent subjects, would never have received their support. In this
way the people of our State, have been frequently inflicted with evil
and injurious legislation. Besides, foreign matter has often been
stealthily incorporated into a law, during the haste and confusion always incident upon the close of the sessions of all legislative bodies,
and it has not unfrequently happened, that in this way the statute
books have shown the existence of enactments, that few of the members of the legislature knew anything of before. To remedy such and
similar evils, was this provision inserted into the constitution, and we
think wisely inserted.
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other reason for the one-subject rule: to protect the integrity of the
governor's veto power. 13 If a bill with disparate subjects is presented
to the governor, he cannot veto the engrafted portions and sign
into law the main subject. 14 Accordingly, if the Maryland Constitution did not contain the one-subject rule, the governor's veto power
would be impacted adversely.
The one-subject rule encompasses two distinct mandates. IS The
first prong of the dual mandates,16 the single-subject prong, requires
that statutes embrace only a single subject. 17 The second prong, the
descriptive-title prong, demands that the title of every statute passed
by the general assembly describes the subject matter of the statute. IS
Each prong is distinct in its purpose and must be considered
separately. The single-subject prong constrains logrolling and vitalizes the governor's veto power. 19 The descriptive-title prong stifles

13.

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

[d. Similarly, in Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184 (1859), eight years after adoption of the MD. CONST. of 1851, the court of appeals stated:
It cannot be doubted, that this restriction upon the Legislature,
was designed to prevent an evil, which had long prevailed in this
State, as it had done elsewhere; which was the practice of blending, in the same law, subjects not connected with each other, and
often entirely different. This was not unfrequently resorted to for
the purpose of obtaining votes, in support of a measure, which
could not have been carried without such a device. And in bills of
a multifarious character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills,
provisions were sometimes smuggled in and passed, in the hurry
of business, toward the close of a session, which, if they had been
presented singly would have been rejected.
[d. at 193.
See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 797, 809 (1987).
The Governor's veto power is found in MD. CONST. art. II, § 17, which follows
a sign-or-veto-all design. Cf Clinton v. New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998).
Under the Line Item Veto Act, Congress granted the President the power to
veto individual provisions contained in statutes that it passed. See id. at 2102.
Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Act was unconstitutional because it
violated the Presentment Clause. See id. at 2108.
See Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364, 366, 100 A. 361, 361 (1917).
See Everstine, supra note 4, at 204.
See Crouse, 130 Md. at 366, 100 A. at 361 (citing MD. CONST. art. III, § 29).
In Crouse, the court of appeals stated that the one-subject rule "deals with two
things: first, the subject of the enactment, and, secondly, its title. The first must
be single, and the second must describe the subject." [d. at 366, 100 A. at 361.
See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 408, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121
(1990).
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deceptive enactments. 2D These prongs are dual mandates, and satisfying merely one prong will not insulate a statute from attack under
the other.21 For example, a statute's title may be sufficiently de scriptive,22 yet the described enactments could still raise a single-subject
issue. 23
Nearly a century and a half after the adoption of the Maryland
Constitution of 1851, the single-subject prong of the one-subject
rule was embraced and re-energized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State. 24 Three years later, the court
of appeals reaffirmed its reliance on the one-subject rule in State v.
Prince Georgians for Glendening. 25 More recently, in Maryland Classified
Employees Ass'n. v. State (MCEA) ,26 the court of appeals apparently
strayed from its holdings in Porten Sullivan and Prince GeorgiansY
This Article reviews recent case law addressing the one-subject
rule and commends the Court of Appeals of Maryland's approach
in Porten Sullivan. Part I outlines the legal development of the onesubject rule. 28 Part II examines the modern reliance on the rule
growing out of the Parten Sullivan decision, also assessing the effect
of MCEA.29 The analysis sections of this Article focus on the singlesubject prong of the one-subject rule because recent court decisions
have not voided statutes under the descriptive-title prong. 3D In Part
III, the potential impacts of MCEA are discussed by way of an illustrative analysis of a recently enacted statute that has not been challenged in the courtsY Finally, Part IV details the contrasting, unbridled congressional mode of legislating, where legislation replete
20. The most renowned deceptive title case may be Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md.
466, 87 A. 413 (1913) (holding a spending act unconstitutional, and thus, void
because a cost estimate in the title of the act grossly understated the costs that
could arise under the act).
21. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 12, 694 A.2d 937,
942 (1997).
22. "While the title must indicate the subject of the Act, it need not give an abstract of its contents, nor need it mention the means and method by which
the general purpose is to be accomplished." Mayor of Baltimore v. Reitz, 50
Md. 574, 579 (1879).
23. See id. at 579, 582.
24. 318 Md. 387,568 A.2d 1111.
25. 329 Md. 68, 617 A.2d 586 (1993).
26. 346 Md. 1,694 A.2d 937 (1997).
27. See id. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944.
28. See infra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 53-168 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 49-168 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 169-91 and accompanying text.
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with incongruous provisions is regularly enacted, concluding that
the congressional process is no model for Maryland. 32
I.

THE BASIC LAW

Legal scholars traced the ongms of the one-subject rule to Roman law. 33 In the United States, efforts aimed at inhibiting multifarious or misdescribed enactments became, and have remained, a viable state constitutional restraint. 34 Indeed, even Maryland's rejected
effort to modernize the existing Maryland Constitution of 1867 (the
"Con Con" of the mid-1960s)35 retained the one-subject rule. The
commentary to the rejected Maryland Constitution of 1967 reemphasized the laudable purposes of the rule,36 concluding that its
32. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
33. See Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 389, 389 (1958); Edward S. Corwin, The ''Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 149, 160 n.36 (1928).
34. Provisions similar to MD. CONST. art. III, § 29, first appeared in the United
States in the ILL. CONST. of 1818. See Ruud, supra note 33, at 389.
35. In 1967, the lOOth anniversary year of Maryland's existing constitution, delegates were elected to what was popularly known as "Con Con." See REpORT OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, IX, XI, XVI (1967) [hereinafter
REpORT]. Meeting from September 12, 1967 to December 12, 1967, the convention produced a thoroughly revised proposed constitution. See id. at 17, 7193. At a special election, the voters subsequently rejected the proposed constitution. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 398, 568 A.2d 1111,
1116 (1990). The court of appeals wrote that "[ t] he 1967 Constitutional Convention Commission Report sheds . . . light on . . . 'the reasons for requiring,' " in the State constitution, that all statutes enacted contain " 'a single
subject [with] a descriptive title.' " [d. (quoting REpORT, supra note 35, at 141).
36. Commenting on the presentation of a "draft section in substance . . . essentially the same as Article III, Section 29 of the present constitution," the Commission wrote:
The purposes of the requirement that every law enacted by the
General Assembly shall embrace but one subject which must be described in its title have been said to be: "To prevent the Legislature
from the enactment of laws surreptitiously; to prevent 'log-rolling'
legislation; to give the people general notice of the character of the
proposed legislation, so they may not be misled; to give all interested
an opportunity to appear before committee~ of the legislature and to
be heard upon the advisability of the proposed legislation; to advise
members of the character of the proposed legislation, and to give
each an opportunity to intelligently watch the course of the proposed
bill; to guard against fraud in legislation, and against false and deceptive titles."
The Commission recognizes that there have been occasions when
sound and desirable legislation has been invalidated by the courts be-
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"absence
might in some instances make it necessary for a legislator to acquiesce in an undesirable bill in order to secure useful
and necessary legislation. "37 Thus, the one-subject rule is firmly
rooted in Maryland's constitutional history. In addition, this restraint on legislation has been endorsed by modem constitutional
revisionists.
When the one-subject rule is violated, however, the statute at issue is not necessarily rendered completely void. 38 Upon judicial review of challenged enactments, courts have severed the main subject from the engrafted provisions. 39
Maryland's common-law severability doctrine was codified in
1973.40 The legislative codification adopted the historic judicial practice, whereby Maryland courts have "always ... held that a law void
in part ... may be good in part."41 Indeed, in Davis v. State,42 the
court of appeals announced a preference for severing the irrelevant
matter from the principal subject. 43

37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.

cause of a technical error in the title, and is also mindful of the fact
that the drafting of titles for legislation has, because of this constitutional provision, become a major chore. Nevertheless, the Commission believes that the reasons for requiring a single subject and a descriptive title are still valid and that the requirement is desirable.
REpORT, supra note 35, at 141 (quoting Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 47374,87 A. 413, 416 (1913».
[d.
See Davis v. State, 7 Md. lSI, 161 (1854).
See Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 389,568 A.2d at 1112.
Since 1973, the Maryland Code has contained a general severability provision,
which provides:
The provisions of all statutes enacted after July I, 1973 are severable
unless the statute specifically provides that its provisions are not severable. The finding by a court that some provision of a statute is unconstitutional and void does not affect the validity of the remaining
portions of that statute, unless the court finds that the remaining
valid provisions alone are incomplete and incapable of being c;xecuted in accordance with the legislative intent.
MD. ANN. CODE art. I, § 23 (1996).
ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 154 (1915).
7 Md. 151.
[d. at 160-61. The Davis court reasoned that a law which is otherwise constitutional, should not be rendered void simply because of the "introduction of a
single foreign or irrelevant subject into it. In such a case the irrelevant matter
would be rejected as void, while the principal subject of the law would be supported, if properly described in the title." [d. When a law contains "a number
of discordant and dissimilar subjects, so that no one could be clearly recognized as the controlling or principal one," however, the courts are obligated

370

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

Nevertheless, the court of appeals has avoided the need to apply the severability doctrine by expressing reluctance to defeat the
will of the legislature. 44 Accordingly, Maryland courts liberally construe statutes and their titles when faced with a litigant challenging
the applicable statute under the one-subject rule. 45 This method of
construing legislation challenged under the one-subject rule caused
scholars to observe that "only a very small proportion of the laws so
attacked have been held invalid."46 Deference to legislative will, despite mandatory constitutional provisions, has received bitter dissenting rebukeY This deference to the legislature might even explain the dearth of recent precedent supporting challenges asserted
under the descriptive-title prong of the one-subject rule.
Under the descriptive-title prong of the one-subject rule, enactments have been voided because the title of the statute did not adequately describe its subject or misdescribed it.48
to intervene and void the entire statute. [d.
See State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 96, 16 A. 445, 446 (1889).
See Hardesty v. Taft, 23 Md. 512, 525 (1865).
NILES, supra note 41, at 154; see Everstine, supra note 4, at 197-98, 245.
See County Comm'rs v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 4648 (1878) (Bowie & Alvey, lJ.,
dissenting). This resounding disapproval came in a test of the single-subject
prong of the dual mandates of the one-subject rule. See id. at 4143.
48. Every case challenging an enactment on the grounds that its title is not descriptive of its subject matter is, like all one-subject rule litigation, sui generis.
Each case relates to a particular title and body of an enactment. On occasion,
the court of appeals has ruled that a title misdescribes the legislation at issue
and voids the bill. See, e.g., Shipley v. State, 201 Md. 96, 104, 93 A.2d 67, 69-72
(1952); Bell v. Board of County Comm'rs, 195 Md. 21, 27-34, 72 A.2d 146, 14950 (1950); Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 22, 194 A. 354, 359 (1937); Culp
v. Comm'rs of Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 627-32, 141 A. 410, 413-15 (1928);
Weber v. Probey, 125 Md. 544, 552-53, 94 A. 162, 165 (1915). The leading case
is Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 87 A. 413 (1913). In Painter, the issue was
the title of 1912 Md. Laws ch. 345, which related to roads in Baltimore
County. See id. at 468, 87 A. at 414. The title of the enactment provided for
$1.5 million in bonds to pay for improved roads; but that title, the court of
appeals found, "diverted public attention from a great and indefinite liability,
in excess of one million five hundred thousand dollars, imposed upon the
taxpayers of the county. It is a glaringly false, deceptive and misleading title."
Id. at 479, 87 A. at 418. Because the provision creating liability in excess of the
bond amount was "an essential portion of the very substance of the whole
scheme of the Act," id. at 479-80, 87 A. at 418, the court struck down the entire Act. See id. at 480, 87 A. at 418.
On the other hand, in some cases, the court has used more narrow titles
to circumscribe the reach of enactments, thus, preserving their constitutionality. See, e.g., Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Elgin, 53 Md. App. 452,
44.
45.
46.
47.
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However, an effective assault has not been mounted under the descriptive-title prong for three decades. 49 A multitude of courts faced
with challenges asserted under the descriptive-title prong have upheld the sufficiency of a title's description. 50
As professional staff has been added to assist the legislature, title drafting to encompass all elements of a bill has been achieved. 51
460, 454 A.2d 408, 413 (1983) (citing Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 127, 54
A.2d 128, 133 (1947»; if. Board of County Comm'rs v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193,
200. {)1, 334 A.2d 89, 93-94 (1975).
49. In Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178,227 A.2d 726 (1967), the
court of appeals was confronted with an enactment having a title describing
the bill as "providing a criminal statute for . . . 'shoplifting,'" which contained a section "providing for the merchants' immunity from civil liability
when" they detained suspected shoplifters "on reasonable grounds." Id. at
183, 227 A.2d at 728. One of the issues on appeal of the lower court's judgment for slander and false imprisonment was whether the merchant's immunity provision was "unconstitutional because the title of the Act [was] defective and misleading in contravention of Art. III, § 29 . " Id. at 182, 227 A.2d at
728. The court held that the merchant's immunity provision was void, but the
criminal provisions were severed and upheld . See id. at 185, 227 A . 2d at 730.
Although the case appears to have been argued and resolved on the issue of
whether the title was deceptive, thereby violating the descriptive-title prong of
the one-subject rule, there is language in the opinion which may support a
conclusion that, in fact, the court of appeals found a single-subject prong violation. In other words, the enactment created criminal penalties for shoplifting and, distinctly, certain civil immunity for a merchant who detained an alleged shoplifter. See id.
50. See, e.g., Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 398, 524 A.2d 77, 86 (1987); WhitingTurner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md . 340, 361, 499 A.2d 178, 189
(1985) (citing Painter, 119 Md. at 473,87 A. at 416); Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y v. Maryland Comm'n Human Relations, 290 Md. 333, 339-43, 430 A.2d
60, 64-65 (1981); Baltimore Transit Co . v. Metropolitan Transit Auth . , 232 Md.
509, 520-22, 194 A.2d 643, 649-50 (1963); Roland Elec. Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 210 Md. 396, 403-04, 124 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1956); Heath v. State, 198
Md . 455, 462-63, 85 A.2d 43, 46-47 (1951); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
176 Md. 682, 688-89, 7 A.2d 176-79 (1939); Mylander v. Connor, 172 Md. 329,
334, 191 A. 430, 432 (1937); Browne v. Mayor of Baltimore, 163 Md. 212, 219,
161 A.2d 24, 27 (1932); Redmond v. State, 155 Md . 13, 17, 141 A. 383, 384
(1928); Dahler v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 133 Md. 644, 64950, 106 A. 10 (1919); Mayor of Baltimore v. Wollman, 123 Md . 310, 314, 91
A . 2d 339,341 (1914).
51. Guidance for staff involved in drafting bills is set forth in MARYlAND STYLE
MANUAL FOR STATUTORY LAw (1985), and LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL
(1989). Each was produced. by the General Assembly'S Department of Legislative Reference. The Maryland Style Manual carefully addressed the titling requirement for bills. The one-subject rule was set out in pertinent part, and, in
1987, two years before the 1989 Session which was the backdrop for Porten Sul-
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Moreover, there has been a trend toward enactment of comprehensive legislation, enactments dealing with a single broad subject, and
the court of appeals has not conceived the one-subject rule to
thwart such broad legislative initiatives. 52 Staff, however, does not
log roll or try to win votes by misjoinder of subjects. That remains,
as recent cases show, a legislative foible.
II. THE RECENT CASES
SinGe 1989, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has decided
three cases in which legislation w;as challenged on the ground of
the one-subject rule. 53 Each case arose out of bills that were passed
after legislative maneuvering during the closing days of a legislative
session. 54 Many of the provisions at issue before the legislature were
controversial, and thus, initially either becalmed because of insuffilivan carp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990), the style guide noted,
"Maryland has one of the strictest title requirements of the 50 states . . . . "
MARYLAND STYLE MANUAL 21. The manual went on to set forth the basic rudiments for the proper drafting of bill titles:
With a few exceptions, all titles have 3 general parts: the short title, the purpose paragraph, and the function paragraph(s) . . . . The
purpose of the short title is to give a general impression of the content of the bill. As a rule, no more than six to eight words need be
used. . . . The purpose paragraph is the part of the title that describes in constitutionally acceptable detail what the bill does. This is
the part of the title to which the constitutional test is actually applied. The purpose paragraph should contain a summary by categories of the changes proposed to be made in the bill.
Id. at 21-22.
52. In upholding sweeping legislation creating and empowering the State's
Human Relations Commission to guard, by the title of the enabling statute,
against "discrimination" and against an attack from the insurance industry,
the court of appeals opined:
The cases reflect that the object of the "one subject" requirement
is not to thwart the legislature when it seeks to pass comprehensive
legislation, see, e.g., Madison Nat'l Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321, 338,
275 A.2d 495 (1971) (involving adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code);. Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 511, 232 A.2d 891 (1967)
(with respect to a Supplemental Appropriations Bill), but merely to
thwart the stealthy incorporation of foreign matter into a bill receiving popular support. Baltimore v. Reitz, [50 Md. 574, 579 (1879)].
Equitable Life, 290 Md. at 34344, 430 A.2d at 66.
53. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 694 A.2d 937
(1997); State v. Prince Georgiahs for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 617 A.2d 586
(1993); Porten SuUivan, 318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111.
54. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71, 617
A.2d at 587; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A.2d at 1114-15.
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cient support or were simply rejected. 55 Despite OpposItIOn, however, the legislature ultimately enacted statutes that incorporated
many of these provisions. 56 Accordingly, each case was resolved after
careful judicial review of the legislative amalgamation of controversial matters into a single statute.
From this trilogy of cases, the traditional grounds for the onesubject rule have been restated and reshapedY Each case requires
careful review in order to discern the court's adherence to certain
long-standing principles. Thorough scrutiny of each court's analysis
demonstrates how Maryland courts have articulated guidelines for
applying the one-subject rule. Additionally, each case is analyzed in
an effort to discern the court's method of applying the guidelines
to the particular legislative circumstances at issue.
A. .Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State
\

.,Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State'8 was the first case in the trilogy
and presents the most comprehensive analysis of the one-subject
rule. Appellants in Porten Sullivan faced a heavy burden because,
historically, the one-subject rule was rarely applied by courts to
strike down a statute. 59 Nonetheless, in Porten Sullivan, judicial reluctance was overcome by what the court of appeals decided was "a
textbook example of legislation designed to frustrate" the very purpose of the one-subject rule. 60 Initially, the House passed a bill that
contained "two uncomplicated and brief tax measures."61 Prince
55. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 5-12, 694 A,2d at 93842; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71,
617 A,2d at 587; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 389-95, 568 A.2d at 1112-14.
56. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12, 694 A,2d at 942; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 71,617
A,2d at 587; Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A,2d at 1114-15.
57. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12-14, 694 A,2d at 94243; Prince Georgians, 329 Md. at 7273,617 A,2d at 587-88; Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 397409,568 A,2d at 1115-22.
58. 318 Md. 387, 568 A,2d 1111 (1990).
59. See id. at 402,568 A,2d at 1118 ("[O]nly twice have we struck down a statute
for a 'single subject' violation."). Even this modest claim was later questioned
and disparaged. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 14 n.3, 694 A,2d at 943 n.3.
60. Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 408, 568 A,2d at 1121.
61. Id. at 389, 568 A,2d at 1112. Parten Sullivan involved a challenge to an emergency measure enacted in the waning days of the 1989 Session of the Maryland General Assembly. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114-15. The Maryland Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to declare (in all but a limited
category of measures, e.g. a law making an appropriation) an enactment "an
emergency law" which requires a vote of "three-fIfths of all of the members
elected to each of the two Houses of the General Assembly." MD. CONST. art.
XVI, § 2. Although the Maryland Constitution seems to say that an "emergency law" should be one "necessary for the immediate preservation of the
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George's County's government and its House delegation pushed the
two tax measures through the House of Delegates. 62 While these
House bills were pending in the Senate, events outside the legislature impacted the legislative process. 63 Specifically, the press reported allegations that political donations from developers and
their allies were improperly influencing members of Prince
George's County's Council in their consideration of zoning
applications. 64
Anti-growth partisans proposed sweeping legislation to their
county's senators. 65 The proposals had two main goals: (1) public
disclosure of contributions to council members,66 and (2) mandated
disqualification of any member from participating in zoning matters
of the contributors. 67 The anti-growth partisans equated the disclosure and disqualification proposals to ethics provisions. 68 These ethics

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

public health and safety," id., the judiciary has deferred to the legislature,
holding that the General Assembly alone has the power to determine when an
emergency exists. See Gebhart v. Hill, 189 Md. 135, 139, 54 A.2d 315, 317
(1947). When a bill is enacted as an emergency measure, it becomes effective
on the date specified in the enactment, regardless of the provision that no law
shall take effect before June 1 in the year of enactment. MD. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 2. Routinely, an emergency law provides that it shall be effective on the date
the bill is signed by the governor. See, e.g., 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 2.
Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 393-94, 568 A.2d at 1114. As the court of appeals
wrote:
[The] legislative beginnings [of the enactment, Ch. 244, 1989
Laws of Md.] were modest: HB 889, designed to extend the life of a
Prince George's County energy tax, and HB 890, intended to do the
same for a special transfer tax in Prince George's County. In the Senate, however, the two uncomplicated and brief tax measures found
themselves embodied in a greatly-amended version of HB 890 that
also enacted extensive ethical regulations pertaining to the Prince
George's County Council. It was only after this metamorphosis that
HB 890 became Chapter 244.
[d. at 389, 568 A.2d at 1112.
See id. at 394, 568 A.2d at 1114.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. Because the tumult over contributions by developers and allies to
county councilman occurred late in the session, those seeking to redress the
issue were constrained by the provision that "during the last thirty-five calendar days of a ... session," a bill can only be introduced with approval of "twothirds" vote. MD. CONST. art. III, § 27.
See Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 395,568 A.2d at 1114. The Parten Sullivan court
described the Senate's amendments as "extensive ethical regulations." [d. at
389, 568 A.2d at 1112.
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proVisIons were subsequently engrafted, by the Senate, onto House
Bill 890. 69 The court of appeals noted:
What had been essentially a one-page bill concerning
"Prince George's County-Transfer Tax" was now transmogrified into lengthy emergency legislation extending to
"Prince George's County Council-Ethics and Taxing Authority." In that form, HB 890 passed the Senate on 6 April
1989, after suspension of the rules.
On 8 April, with but 'two days remaining in the 1989
session, a divided Prince George's County House delegation
endorsed the bill. It passed the House on 10 April, the last
day of the 1989 session, and thus became Chapter 244.70
The ethics provisions were challenged on federal and state constitutional grounds. 71 One challenge was related to the amalgamation of ethics provisions and taxing provisions. 72 That challenge was
predicated on the one-subject rule. 73 In resolving the case, the court
of appeals addressed only the challenge asserted under the onesubject rule. 74
The Appellant's challenge was "straightforward,"75 arguing:
The "tax" measures have been treated as subjects of separate legislation in the past. The "tax" provisions now contained in Chapter 244 have nothing to do with development
control or ethics. They are revenue measures the proceeds
of which have been used to fund education, drug programs,
and other needs of Prince George's County. The special
69. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114.
70. [d. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1114-15.
71. See id. at 395, 568 A.2d at 1115. The court of appeals explained:
The complaint alleged that Chapter 244 violated the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights in numerous ways; the equal protection guarantees of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and Article 24 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights; Article III, § 29 of the Maryland
Constitution; the Home Rule Amendment of Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution; and the separation of powers required by Article
8 of the Declaration of Rights.
[d.
72. See id. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Chapter 244 violated Article III,
Section 29 of the Maryland Constitution. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 396, 568 A.2d at 1115.
75. [d.
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"ethics" portions of Chapter 244 have nothing to do with
taxation or revenue raising. "It is simple sophistry to join,
as one subject, ethics and taxing authority. "76
To the contrary, the State argued "that the single subject here is the
management of public affairs in Prince George's County."77
The court of appeals reviewed the history of the one-subject
rule,78 the cases construing it,79 and the construction given to similar provisions by other states. 80 The court noted its traditional deference to legislative action, its liberal construction of the one-subject
rule, and the court's rare invocation of the one-subject rule to strike
down an enactment. 81 Nevertheless, the court stated: "[T]he 'singlesubject' provision is still a part of our Constitution. As such, it is not
to be treated as a dead letter, and we believe we must apply it to
the statute now before us. "82
The court of appeals found the ethics provisions of "Chapter
244 distinct from those" provisions relating to taxes. 83 Furthermore,
the court ruled that the statute "d[id] not provide broadly for the
structure and organization of Prince George's County government,"84 and was not comprehensive legislation. 85
The Parten Sullivan court recognized that certain general statements from the legislature guided its effort to apply the one-subject
rule. 86 In particular, the court of appeals noted the importance of
76. Id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at 46, Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md.
387, 568 A.2d 1111 (1990) (No. 93».
77. Id. at 396, 568 A.2d at 1115.
78. See id. at 397-98, 568 A.2d at 1115-16.
79. See id. at 399-403, 568 A.2d at 1116-19.
80. See id. at 398-403, 568 A.2d at 1116-18.
81. See id. at 402, 568 A.2d at 1118.
82. Id. at 403, 568 A.2d at 1118.
83. Id. at 404, 568 A.2d at 1119.
84. Id. at 405, 568 A.2d at 1119-20. In passing, the court of appeals noted that the
title to Chapter 244 did not "suggest that the general structure and organization of Prince George's County are" the subject of the enactment. Id. at 405,
568 A.2d at 1120; if. Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 18486, 227 A.2d 726, 729-30 (1967) (discussing the law as it applies to the titling
of a bill).
85. See Porten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 405-D6, 568 A.2d at 1120 (citing Madison Nat'l
Bank v. Newrath, 261 Md. 321, 275 A.2d 495 (1971». The Newrath court upheld the Vniform Commercial Code against a one-subject rule attack because,
despite the extensive nature of the V.C.C., it dealt with only" 'one general
subject--commercial transactions-[albeit with] many related aspects.''' Id. at
406, 568 A.2d at 1120 (quoting Newrath, 261 Md. at 338, 275 A.2d at 504).
86. See id. at 402, 568 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Whiting-Turner Contract Co. v.
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the following language: "distinct and incongruous"87 subjects may
not be joined, while "connection and interdependence"88 are akin
to "germaneness"89 and support constitutionality.9o However, the
court understood "the difficulty of defining with precision when a
measure contains 'distinct and incongruous subjects.' "91
In an effort to provide some guidance, the court suggested that
"a measure that begins life as a comprehensive one, and then has
additional details inserted may survive a [one-subject rule] attack
more readily than an originally narrow bill which becomes a very
broad one. "92 Despite this attempt to offer guidance, according to
the court of appeals, the "question ordinarily must be answered on
a case-by-case basis," giving due regard to the reasons given for the
single-subject rule:
1. To avoid the necessity for a legislator to acquiesce in a
bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and necessary legislation; to prevent the engrafting of foreign matter
on a bill, which foreign matter might not be supported if
offered independently.
2. To protect, on similar ground, a governor's veto power. 93
Viewing the 1989 statute as "a textbook example of legislation
designed to frustrate these purposes,"94 the Porten Sullivan court
held that Chapter 244 failed the single-subject prong of the onesubject rule. 95 Even though the statute violated the single-subject
prong of the one-subject rule by "contain[ing] two distinct and incongruous subjects,"96 the court severed the ethics provision, and
Coupard, 304 Md. 340,499 A.2d 178 (1985».
[d. at 406, 568 A.2d at 1120.
[d. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1121.
[d. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICIlONARY 618 (5th ed. 1979».
See id. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1121.
[d. at 406, 568 A.2d at 1120.
[d. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1120.
[d. at 408, 568 A.2d at 1121 (citing Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859);
Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854); REpORT, supra note 35, at 141).
94. [d. at 408, 568 A.2d at 1121. Although the legislative amalgamation at issue in
Pmen Sullivan occurred in the waning days of the 1989 session of the General
Assembly, the court of appeals did not emphasize that fact, despite the venerable concern about the hurry of business (and resulting opportunity for legislative mischief) in the rush to close the session. See supra note 12.
95. See Pmen Sullivan, 318 Md. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121-22.
96. [d. at 409, 568 A.2d at 1121.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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thus, preserved the tax provision. 97
B.

State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening

Despite Porten Sullivan, in 1992 the legislature repeated its
amalgamation efforts by engrafting a revised" 'ethics' bill applicable
to local elected officials in Prince George's County" onto a bill
aimed at governing planning and zoning matters in Montgomery
County.98 In State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening,99 the court of appeals held that this statute violated the one-subject rule. loo The
court applied Porten Sullivan without breaking any new doctrinal
ground.
The Prince Georgian's court determined that the Montgomery
County planning and zoning provisions and the Prince George's
County ethics standards were simply " 'distinct and incongruous'
and 'distinct and separate.' "101 The court used the case-by-case approach and dwelled on the legislative trail that the erroneously
joined matters followed in the General Assembly.102 In short, Prince
Georgians recognized, for doctrinal purposes, the seminal quality of
Porten Sullivan.103 Together, these two decisions illustrate that distinct and separate, non-germane matters do not pass muster under
the single-subject prong of the one-subject rule.
After Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, the single-subject
prong of the one-subject rule was hardly a dead letter. This constitutional mandate, together with the descriptive-title prong, restrained
the logrolling and "Christmas tree"l04 legislation that were increasingly becoming the congressional modes of enacting federal legislation over the past two decades.105 Maryland, unlike Congress, prohibits the blending of unconnected subjects in legislation and the
97. See id. at 409-11, 568 A.2d at 1122.
98. State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 71, 617 A.2d at 586, 587
(1993).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 75-76, 617 A.2d at 589 (holding that the zoning provisions and ethics
and elections standards in Chapter 643 of the Acts of 1992 were indeed "distinct and incongruous" and therefore violated the one-subject rule).
101. Id.
.
102. See id. at 74-75, 617 A.2d at 588-89. The court noted that bills to enact ethics
provisions applicable to Prince George's County Council members had been
introduced, but not enacted, in both the 1990 and 1991 sessions of the General Assembly. See id. at 71, 617 A.2d at 587.
103. See id. at 72, 617 A.2d at 587-88.
104. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
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smuggling of incongruous subjects into omnibus bills. 106 It does so
in large measure because of the firm, though somewhat vague, command of the one-subject rule. The final case in the trilogy, Maryland
Classified Employees Ass'n v. State,I07 provided the court of appeals an
opportunity to alter what Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians had
revitalized.
C.

Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State

In Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State,108 a pilot program
intended to privatize certain child support enforcement services was
appended to a welfare reform measure, and challenged on the basis
of the one-subject rule. \09 A union and seven of its members sought
a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of Chapter 491 of the
1995 Maryland Laws were unconstitutional. 110
The challenged provisions created a four-year pilot program for
privatizing child support enforcement services in Baltimore City and
Queen Anne's County. III Previously, these county's child support enforcement services were provided by state unionized employees
working for the Department of Human Resources.ll2 Appellants
contended that the merger of provisions aimed at privatizing child
support with welfare reform provisions involved true legislative manipulation. ll3 Nevertheless, the blended statute withstood constitutional challenge. 114
The background for the legislative commingling of separate
bills was a political debate that continued over several sessions of
the General Assembly.ll5 In 1994, Governor Schaefer supported legislation "authorizing a comprehensive pilot program of AFDC reform in three subdivisions of the State, but then vetoed the bill be106. Cf Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859) ("And in bills of a multifarious
character, not inappropriately called omnibus bills, provisions were sometimes
smuggled in and passed, in the hurry of business, toward the close of a session, which, if they had been presented singly would have been rejected.").
107. 346 Md. 1,694 A.2d 937 (1997).
108. [d.
109. See id. at 3, 694 A.2d at 938.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 4-5, 694 A.2d at 938 ("Particularly egregious, in [Appellants] view,
was the manner in which the consolidation was accomplished."). See id. at 512, 694 A.2d at 93842, for details of the legislative history.
114. See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946.
115. See id. at 34, 694 A.2d at 938.
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cause of certain amendments added by the Legislature."1l6 Mter
Governor Schaefer left office, nineteen bills were introduced in the
1995 session dealing with public assistance programs, including four
similar to the 1994 bill that Governor Schaefer had vetoed. 117 Further, thirty-one bills proposed in 1995 dealt "with child or spousal
support." 118 The constitutional challenge at issue in MCEA arose
from events that occurred during the waning moments of the 1995
session, when House Bill 1177, after its defeat in the Senate, was engrafted onto Senate Bill 754. 119
Senate Bill 754 was introduced to establish a pilot program for
welfare reform. 120 The pilot program was primarily designed to create supervised job search activities and to allow counties to terminate AFDC payments if either the work requirement was not met or
excused. 121 On the Senate floor, Senate Bill 754 was amended to allow for the suspension of one's driver's license where a driver fails
to make child support payments. 122 Senate Bill 754 made its way
through the Senate while House Bill 1177 moved through the
House. 123
House Bill 1177, as introduced, called for a privatization pilot
program for child support enforcement. 124 The House passed the
116. Id. Governor Schaefer's veto message may be found at 1994 Md. Laws 3865.
See id.
117. See id.
118. [d.
119. See id. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942. The House approved the engraftment of House
Bill 1177 onto Senate Bill 754 "[O]n the evening of ... the final day for legislative action .... " Id. Thereafter, Senate Bill 754, as amended, "was returned
to the Senate for concurrence." Id. The Senate concurred at 10:50 p.m., seventy minutes before the General Assembly adjourned sine die. See id.
120. See id. at 5, 694 A.2d at 938-39 (noting that Senate Bill 754 was initially intended to establish pilot programs in three subdivisions: Baltimore City, Anne
Arundel County, and Prince George's County).
121. See id. at 6, 694 A.2d at 939.
122. See id. at 7, 694 A.2d at 940. The driver's license suspension provision was not
directly at issue in MCEA. Still, one wonders what rationalization could be
proffered to support suspending a driver's license to enforce something as unrelated as welfare reform and child support. While suspending a driver's licenses might be germane to enforcement in general, it surely would not be immune from constitutional doubt given the reasons behind the one-subject
rule. Cf supra text accompanying notes 8-14..
123. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 7, 694 A.2d at 940.
124. See id. Initially, House Bill 1177 was intended to create programs in Baltimore
City and in two unspecified counties to be selected by the Department of
Human Resources. See id. The Department was to adopt regulations requiring
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bill after it was amended to include a driver's license suspension
sanction. 125 The Senate, however, ultimatelyI26 defeated House Bill
1177.127
On the same day that House Bill 1177 failed in the Senate, Senate Bill 754 began to move in the House. 128 A number of amendments were adopted, including "the [same] child support enforcement 'privatization' provisions that had been included in House Bill
1177."129 Mter these amendments were adopted, the House passed
Senate Bill 754, and returned the bill to the Senate for concurrence. I3O At 10:50 p.m. on the last night of the 1995 session, the
Senate concurred in the House amendments.13I Thereafter, the bill
was signed into law by Governor Glendening. 132
The resurrection of the provision privatizing child support enforcement from the defeated rubble of House Bill 1177, via enactment of Senate Bill 754, was particularly galling to the bill's opponents, primarily the state's unionized employees. 133 Their challenge

125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.

the transfer of all aspects of child support enforcement to one or more private contractors. See id. Before it passed the House, House Bill 1177 was
amended to limit the program to Baltimore City and one county. See id. at 9,
694 A.2d at 941. As a paean to unionized state employees, House Bill 1177 required private contractors to offer employment to displaced state employees.
See id.
See id.
Duririg Senate consideration, House Bill 1177 was amended to limit the program to Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County, and allowed any state employee to return to state service with protected benefits and seniority rights.
See id. at 11, 694 A.2d at 942.
See id. Two days before the end of the legislative session, the Senate defeated
House Bill 1177 by a 24-23 vote. See id.
See id.
Id. at 12, 694 A.2d at 942.
See id.
See id.
See id. The bill became Chapter 491 of the 1995 Laws of Maryland. See id. In
accordance with the new statute's command, "the Board of Public Works approved a contract transferring the child support enforcement functions in the
two subdivisions to Lockheed Martin IMS." Id. at 12 n.2, 694 A.2d at 942 n.2.
A news report on MCEA appeared in The Daily Record. See Bradey A. Kukuk,
Union Bid to Overturn Privatization of Support Enforcement Rejected, DAILY REc.,
June 10, 1997, at 17A-18A. That report, in part, read:
In 1995, the Senate failed by one vote to pass HB 1177, a bill that
would allow a private company to perform child support collection
services in Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County.
State workers lobbied hard against the bill ... and defeated it by
a single vote. But, in the closing moments of the session, legislators
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to the enactment of Senate Bill 754, however, was rejected by the
court of appeals. 134 Mter reviewing Porten Sullivan, and considering
evidence 135 of "[ t] he nexus between child support enforcement and
weaning people off of AFDC,"136 the MCEA court concluded that
the one-subject rule was not violated. 137 The court reasoned that
there was "not just a close connection, but a true interdependence,
between effective child support enforcement and the goal of significandy reducing the number of people relying on AFDC."138 Therefore, a "pilot program of 'privatizing' child support enforcement in
Baltimore City and Queen Anne's County" was said to be a legitimate
part of the statute's goal.139
Beyond its basic holding, MCEA is important for the following
reasons: (1) its search for evidence of congruity or germaneness beyond the Maryland legislative history,140 (2) the irrelevance of the
defeat of House Bill 1177,141 and (3) its handling of the precedent
set by Porten Sullivan. 142
1.

Evidence Used

A notable feature of MCEA was the court's use of congressional
and other federal declarations to find "[ t] he nexus between child

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.

142.

added virtually the entire text of HB 1177 onto the Welfare Reform
Act, SB 754.
[MCEA's attorney] said senators faced a catch-22. If the 24 senators who voted against the privatization bill tried to remain consistent
and vote against it again, they would be on record as opposing welfare reform. That's the situation the single subject rule was designed
to prevent, he said.
Id. at 18A.
See MCEA, 346 Md. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946.
See id. at 17-21, 694 A.2d at 94546.
Id. at 18, 694 A.2d at 945.
See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946.
Id.
Id. at 21, 694 A.2d at 946. In effect, the court of appeals found that a privatized pilot program was just a means to administer welfare reform, and that
privatized enforcement was not a distinct subject. See id. Regardless, two years
after privatization, no great improvement had been accomplished. See Robert
E. Pierre, Baltimore's Test of Privatization Comes up Short, WASH. POST, January 25,
1998, at B1.
See MCEA, 346 Md. at 18-20, 694 A.2d at 94546.
Aside from stating that House Bill 1177 was defeated, the court did not discuss how, or whether, its defeat impacted the court's one-subject rule analysis.
See id. at 11, 694 A.2d at 942. One could conclude, therefore, that its defeat
was irrelevant to MCEA's one-subject rule analysis.
See id. at 12-16, 694 A.2d at 942-44.
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support enforcement and weaning people off AFDC."143 Various
congressional reports and enactments, as well as testimony from
congressional hearings were used to demonstrate the true interdependence between effective child support enforcement and reduction of AFDC dependency.l44 This evidence, however, was independently gathered by the court, and not presented in either of the
parties' briefs filed in the case. 145
The required nexus between the nature of welfare and enforcement of child support may have been a peculiarly apt area for guidance from federal actions. 146 State statutes and their respective legislative histories generally do not include extra-territorial
evidence. 147 Moreover, the use of congressional commentary to
demonstrate the required nexus is no more unusual than where, in
Porten Sullivan, the court of appeals reviewed a host of out-of-state
cases-not cited by the parties-to lend credence to its formulation
of the rationale for the one-subject rule. 148
2. The Irrelevance of the Defeat of House Bill 1177
The legal analysis employed by the MCEA court gave no weight
to the defeat of House Bill 1177.149 The MCEA court, through its silence, implied that the one-subject rule does not, by its terms, forbid the joinder of a defeated bill's provisions with another separately enacted bill. ISO The court's silence about the defeat of House
Bill 1177 emphasized what students of the legislature, or lobbyists,
have always known: defeat of a bill does not bring the curtain down
on a legislative idea, so long as bills dealing with the same subject
remain alive. The one-subject rule forbids an illicit amalgamation of
disparate items. 151 However, it does not forbid joinder that can be
justified under a convenient umbrella of items which do not cause
143. [d. at 18, 694 A.2d at 945.
144. See id. at 18-21, 694 A.2d at 945-46.
145. See id.

146. Funds for welfare come from the federal coffers. State agencies administer the
programs funded under a mix of state and federal provisions.
147. Few areas of the law are as intertwined between state and federal provisions as
welfare.
148. See Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 399-401, 568 A.2d 1111, 111617 (1990).
149. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 12-20, 694 A.2d at 942-46.
150. The one-subject rule is not the once killed/always dead rule.
151. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 29 (1981).
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one to choke when the claim of incongruity is made. 152

3.

Porten Sullivan Mter MCEA

MCEA recognized Porten Sullivan as definitive precedent for
interpreting the one-subject rule,153 but only after emphasizing that
the court has afforded the legislature significant leeway.154 While
construing one-subject rule challenges,155 and even minimizing the
number of occasions when the court has used the single-subject
prong to strike down legislation,156 the MCEA court seemed to go
off on a tangent rather than embrace the Porten Sullivan interpreta152. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 17 n.5, 694 A.2d at 945 n.5 (explaining that the court's
role was to determine whether the legislature's act of joining two subjects was
reasonable) .
153. The court noted its recent exploration of "the history and purpose of the single subject requirement" in Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, and quoted
from Porten Sullivan to summarize "the objective of the clause as 'prevent[ing]
the combination in one act of several and distinct incongruous subjects.' .. Id.
at 12-13, 694 A.2d at 942-43 (quoting Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md.
387,402,568 A.2d 1111, 1118 (1990».
154. See id. at 13, 694 A.2d at 943.
155. See id. at 12-14, 694 A.2d at 942-43.
156. See id. at 14 n.3, 694 A.2d at 943 n.3. The MCEA court asserted that Curtis v.
Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 80 A. 1066 (1911), was a descriptive-title prong case
rather than a case that applied the entire one-subject rule. See MCEA, 346 Md.
at 14 n.3, 694 A.2d at 943 n.3. Judge Pearce's opinion in Curtis does not support such a crimped construction because he wrote:
The Act under consideration manifestly undertakes to legislate
upon two wholly distinct subjects, under a title by which only one of
those subjects is described. Even if the title had fully indicated both
of the matters proposed to be covered by the Act, the situation
would not have been improved, because this would nevertheless have
been in obvious violation of section 29 of Article 3 of the State Constitution which provides that 'every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described by
its title.' This. constitutional provision has been frequently construed,
and there can be no difficulty in its application to the statute here
involved. The purpose of the requirement we have quoted from the
Constitution has been repeatedly defined. It is intended to accomplish two objects: 'The first is to prevent the combination in one Act
of several distinct and incongruous subjects; and the second is that
the Legislature and the people of the State may be fairly advised of
the real nature of pending legislation.'
Id. at 394, 80 A. at 1069 (citing County Comm'n. v. School Comm'rs Worcester
County, 113 Md. 305,77 A. 605 (1910); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110
Md. 667, 73 A. 710 (1909); Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 57 A. 617 (1904);
State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 16 A. 445 (1889».

1998]

Maryland's One-Subject Rule

385

tive approach. 157
Initially, the MCEA court seemed to have embraced the Parten
Sullivan approach. 15S However, the MCEA court chose to travel a
new path with regard to the scope of legislation involved, even
though the Porten Sullivan court, in the portion approvingly
adopted in MCEA, had stated:
[N]otions of connection and interdependence may vary
with the scope of the legislation involved. That is, a measure that begins life as a comprehensive one, and then has
additional details inserted may survive a [one-subject rule]
attack more readily than an originally narrow bill which becomes a very broad one. It is of some significance that the
legislation involved in cases like Clinton, Panitz, Newrath, and
Meekins was comprehensive at its outset; it was not vastly expanded by incongruous amendments. 159
Rather than considering how the vehicle l60 began its legislative life,
however, the MCEA court wrote:
Connection and interdependence can be on either a horizontal or vertical plane. Two matters can be regarded as a
single subject, for purposes of [the one-subject rule], either
because of a direct connection between them, horizontally,
or because they each have a direct connection to a broader
common subject to which the Act relates. 161
Although there was no clear conclusion as to which plane connected
the matters in House Bill 1177, the court did find true interdependence between effective child support enforcement and welfare
reform. 162
157. See MCEA, 346 Md. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944.
158. See id. at 14, 694 A.2d at 943. Indeed, the MCEA court announced:
As we pointed out in Parten Sullivan, proper application of the "single subject" clause requires consideration of how closely connected
and interdependent the several matters contained within an Act may
be, and "notions of connection and interdependence may vary with
the scope of the legislation involved."
Id. (citing Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 407, 568 A.2d at 1120).
159. Parten Sullivan, 318 Md. at 407, 568 A.2d at ll20.
160. The legislative "vehicle" is the main bill onto which the adornment is placed.
See MCEA, 346 Md. at 15-16, 694 A.2d at 944.
161. Id.
1162. See id. at 20-21, 694 A.2d at 946.
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Mter MCEA, Porten Sullivan remains vital. MCEA clearly recognized and approved the courts' holdings in Porten Sullivan and
Prince Georgians. 163 A bill with limited purposes could not, consistent
with the one-subject rule, carry the weight of an unrelated measure. l64 Nevertheless, the MCEA court spoke of having either a
"common umbrella" or a "common denominator,"165 terminology
that was absent from the first two decisions in the trilogy.166 Neither
these phrases nor reference to "horizontal or vertical" interconnection are as clear or apt as the Porten Sullivan admonition to determine whether the vehicle adorned started as a comprehensive or
narrow bill. 167
The measurably different emphasis placed on the nature of the
original bill used in Porten Sullivan may be more than an academic
distinction. It could be the basis for a different result in a given
case. The following Part of this Article illustrates the potential impact of MCEA by analyzing a recently enacted statute. The statute
analyzed is House Bill 1394, which the Maryland General Assembly
enacted in 1996. 168 While this statute has never faced a one-subject
rule challenge in the courts, it will serve as a basis to illustrate the
potential impact of the MCEA court's holding.

III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 1394 (1996)
In 1996, House Bill 1394 was introduced by the Washington
County House Delegation as an act "concerning Washington County
- Hotel Tax - Civil War Tourism [f] or the purpose of altering the
rate of the hotel tax imposed in Washington County."169 The substance of the introduced bill merely increased the rate of the Washington County hotel tax from 3% to 3.5% for fiscal year 1997, and
provided that the additional revenues should be used to promote
Civil War tourism in the Washington County area. 170 The bill un ani163. See id. at 15, 694 A.2d at 943-44.
164. See id. at 15, 694 A.2d at 944 ("Parten Sullivan and Prince Georgians illustrate the
kind of circumstances in which the 'single subject' requirement is, in fact,
violated.").
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 58-103 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
168. See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 665.
169. 2 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at 1032
(1996).
170. See Floor Repart of the House Ways and Means Committee found in the bill file on
H.B. 1394, found in the Department of Legislative Reference Library, 90 State
Circle, Annapolis.
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mously passed in the House on March 22, 1996.171
The Senate transmogrified 172 the bill. The title was revised to
state that the amended bill was an act concerning "Local Subdivisions-Revenues." The amended bill went beyond the version passed
in the House by "authorizing Baltimore City to use certain highway
user revenues ... [and permitting the use] 'by certain local subdivisions' " of certain revenues to promote tourism. 173 The text of the
amended bill allowed Baltimore City to use highway user revenues
for fiscal year 1997 to finance the costs of convention center marketing and debt service. 174 In addition, the amended bill altered the
City Charter's general powers so that the city could impose a hotel
and room tax of up to 7.5% for fiscal year 1997.175
The Senate version of House Bill 1394 passed the Senate,176 and
the House concurred (95-33) in the Senate version. 177 The result
was that a bill relating solely to supporting Civil War Tourism in
Washington County transmogrified into a bill to do that and
more-fund convention center marketing and debt service. l78
Under the proscription in Porten Sullivan,179 this enactment would

171. See 2 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE at 1855.
172. Cf Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 395,568 A.2d 1111, 1114
(1990).
173. 3 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF MARYLAND, at 2930 (1996).
174. See id. at 2931.
175. See id. at 2931-32.
176. See id. at 2932.
177. See 4 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at
3056 (1996).
178. The bill as amended and enacted is found at 1996 Md. Laws ch. 665. On its
face, the numerous amendments are obvious. The legislative file in the Department of Legislative Reference Library contains both the "Floor Report" by
the House Ways and Means Committee and the "Concurrence Report" after
the Senate action. Read together, the transformation is apparent. The Floor
Report to the unadorned bill characterized it as a local Washington County
bill which increased the Washington County Hotel Tax and required expenditures for the promotion of Civil War Tourism in Washington County. See 2
JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND, at 1032
(1996). On the other hand, the Concurrence Report refers to the previously
stated purpose and describes the Senate amendments as, permitting Baltimore
City to use up to $5 million of its Highway User Revenues in FY 97 for Convention Center Marketing and prohibiting the City from increasing its hotel
tax rate above 7.5%. See 4 JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF MARyLAND, at 3056 (1996).
179. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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appear void as far as the adornments for Baltimore City were
concerned.
House Bill 1394 did not begin life as a comprehensive bill. It had
a distinct, limited purpose-the promotion of Civil War tourism in
Washington County.180 As amended, it appears painfully similar to
the statutory provision voided in Prince Georgians. 181 How congruous
or germane is support for Civil War tourism in Washington County
with debt service and marketing for a Convention Center in Baltimore City? Thus, applying Porten Sullivan and Prince Georgians, one
would conclude that the relationship is too attenuated.
On the other hand, the later decided MCEA, with its distinction
between horizontal and vertical interconnection,182 and with the
statute's amended title rubric of tourism, might offer a rationale for
approval. I83 However, MCEA dealt with a vehicle that started its legislative life as a comprehensive measure, not as an originally narrow
bill. 184 Notably, the Porten Sullivan discussion that was avoided in
MCEA, seems vitally important, particularly to those watching the
legislative session. A legislator, a lobbyist, or citizens in favor of or
against aid to the Baltimore City Convention Center would have
had no realistic need to be concerned about a Washington County
local bill aimed at Civil War Tourism. The joinder of these two subjects, aid to the Convention Center with a Western Maryland local
bill,185 was joinder of the non-germane. Regardless, Chapter 665 of
the 1996 Laws of Maryland has never been challenged in the
courts. 186
This example illustrates that Maryland legislators will continue
to find vehicles to attach unrelated adornments. These amalgams
will be the exception, rather than the regular mode of legislating in
180. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
181. See generally State v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68, 71, 617
A.2d 586, 587 (1993).
182. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 15-16, 694 A.2d
937,944 (1997).
183. Can a Washington County hotel tax for use for Civil War Tourism be vertically
connected through tourism to Baltimore City's use of its highway revenues
and its hotel tax for marketing of, and debt service on, the Convention
Center located in Baltimore?
184. Compare Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387, 407, 568 A.2d 1111, 1120
(1990), with supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
186. When no attack is mounted, the one-subject rule does not become a dead letter; rather, it seems to become an unused letter. See generally Parten Sullivan,
318 Md. 387, 568 A.2d 1111.
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Maryland because the one-subject rule chastens and circumscribes
the vast bulk of state enactments. 187 Nonetheless, it is relevant to
question how freely these exceptions will persist if constitutional
challenges are mounted in the courts.
While MCEA recognized Porten Sullivan as the interpretative
precedent,188 MCEA is surely a step, perhaps a leap, away from the
vitality infused in the one-subject rule by Porten Sullivan. MCEA
clearly applies a liberal interpretive approach, giving deference to
legislative action. 189 The MCEA court announced:
That liberal approach is intended to accommodate a significant range and degree of political compromise that necessarily attends the legislative process in a healthy, robust democracy. It has sufficient fluidity to accommodate, as well,
the fact that many of the issues facing the General Assembly
today are far more complex than those coming before it in
earlier times and that the legislation needed to address the
problems underlying those issues often must be
multifaceted. 190
The need for multifaceted legislation has been the excuse for
congressional enactments that join apparently disparate subjects. 191
Thus, the language employed by the MCEA court raises the question: Will MCEA lead Maryland's legislature to embrace the pattern
of lawmaking that has become prevalent in Congress?

187. The one-subject rule surely is known to staff. See supra note 51.
188. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
189. See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 13-14, 694 A.2d
937,943 (1997).
190. [d. The court's footnote to this passage illuminated the point further:
The marked growth in the size, scope, and complexity of State government itself, along with the new areas over which it has asserted
regulatory jurisdiction, are matters of common knowledge subject to
judicial notice. Simplistic and single-focused approaches are not always possible, and indeed may well be wholly inappropriate, when
dealing with some of the health, environmental, economic, and social problems facing modem society.
[d.

191. A clear recent joinder of disparate subjects occurred when Congress passed,
in 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, which joined immigration reform enactments
and other non-spending substantive matters with an appropriations bill. See
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996).
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IV. AN UNBRIDLED CONGRESS
Congress has no constitutionally imposed one-subject constraint. Consequently, federal enactments can include disparate subjects in one legislative vehicle, as recently evidenced by the passage
of an omnibus appropriations bill that included a provision on immigration reform. 192 Christmas Tree bills-uncontroversial or essential
measures on which "ornaments" consisting of a host of unrelated,
disparate items-are a frequent congressional method of
legislating. 193
192. In 1997, the Congress passed 110 Stat. 3009 (1997), described as "An Act making omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1997, and for other purposes." [d. The other purposes included the following: (1) a 178 page adornment "Division C-Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996," 110 Stat. 3009-546 to 3009-724; (2) the
"Small Business Programs Improvement Act," 110 Stat. 3009-724; (3) a "Gun
Ban for Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence," 110 stat. 3009-371; and (4) a declaration of legislative policy regarding
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1996), 110 Stat. 3009-369 to 3009-371 (1996), an apparent
attempt to affect United States v. Lopez., 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995),
which had declared that § 922 (a) exceeded Congress's commerce clause authority. [d. The President's Signing Statement for Pub. L. No. 104-208 recognized the adorned scope of the appropriations act:
This, bill, however, does more than fund major portions of the Government for the next fiscal year. It also includes landmark immigration reform legislation that builds on our progress of the last 3 years.
It strengthens the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system- without punishing those living in the United States legally.
Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act, Statement by President of U.S.,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.C.CAN. (110 Stat. 3009) 3388, 3391. The signing statement even recognized the Congressional methods of adorning legislation when the President complained that an adornment he sought had not
been added:
I am disappointed that one of my priorities- a ban on physician
"gag rules"- was not included. Several States have passed similar legislation to ensure that doctors have the freedom to inform their patients of the full range of medical treatment options, and I am disappointed that the Congress was not able to reach agreement on this
measure.
[d. at 3392.
193. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, was described by the
President in his Signing Statement as "a balanced package of spending provisions that includes targeted program cuts while it invests in America's future."
President's Statement on Signing the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 33 WKLY.
COMPo PRES. Doc. 1190 (Aug. 11, 1997). The Act, however, contained numerous non-spending adornments: (1) "a sentencing commission . . . charged
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A particularly expansive example occurred with the enactment
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 194 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 was a drug fighting bill, impervious to challenge. The act was
altered to include such incongruous measures as follows: child pornography and obscenity legislation,195 reform of the U.S. Marshals
service,196 truck and bus safety regulatory reform,197 and putative repeal of McNally v. United States,198 which had circumscribed mail
fraud prosecutions. 199

194.

195.

196.
197.

198.
199.

with developing a Truth-in-Sentencing system"; (2) a Department of Justice initiative to deal with "a number of Establishment Clause constitutional concerns with respect to" health care services under Medicare and Medicaid; (3)
an authorization to the Department "of Health and Human Services to develop a legislative proposal for establishing a case-mix adjusted prospective
payment system for payment of long-term care hospitals under the Medicare
program"; and (4) broaden authorization to the Federal Communications
Commission "to auction the right to use the radio and television spectrum."
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 101 Stat. 251, 671-71, 677-72
(1997).
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). The
Act contained 364 pages but its legislative history had neither a Senate nor
House Report. See id. at 5937. It had ten titles, some of which were unrelated
to drug enforcement.
This statute, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988), was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act as the "subtitle [to] be cited as the 'Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988.' " Id.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.
4512-17).
Id. at 4527-35 (1988). This section was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act as the "subtitle" to be "cited as the 'Truck and Bus Safety and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1988.' " Id.
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(1988). The background for this amendment and a critique of the congressional process is found in Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1127 (1997). There, the author writes:
In 1987, the Supreme Court brought intangible rights prosecutions
to an unexpected halt by deciding, in McNally v. United States, that
the mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property rights
and did not protect intangible rights such as honest services. . . .
[T]he Court invited Congress to "speak more clearly than it has" if it
intended the statute to reach intangible rights.
Congress promptly responded to the Court's challenge to "speak
more clearly" and reinstated the intangible rights doctrine by amending the mail fraud statute.
Id. at 1166-67. Although the author noted the prompt legislative response, she
documented the limited legislative history, the adornment on an election year
Christmas Tree Bill, and the judicial recognition of the inadequacy of the
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Another typical example of a Christmas Tree bill is the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.200 This act was a
355 page statute that contained a host of miscellaneous adornments
far removed from violent crime, and included as follows: (1) a clarifying amendment regarding the scope of prohibition against gambling on ships in international waters;201 (2) enactment of the "Recreational Hunting Safety Act" with provisions barring "obstruction
of a lawful hunt" and providing civil penalties therefor;202 and (3)
"Other Provisions"203 dealing with, inter alia, "labels on products,"204
"non-dischargeability of payment of restitution order[s],"205 new
Federal Rules of Evidence making "evidence of similar crimes [admissible] in sex offense cases,"206 the "definition of livestock,"207 and
disclosure of wiretap information to impede a criminal
investigation. 208
In the absence of anyone-subject constraint, Congress engaged
in one of its spectacles of joinder of the incongruous in temporal
juxtaposition to MCEA-they happened at the same time. The congressional spectacle involved the Disaster Relief Act of 1997, a bill
needed to authorize federal funds to help the flood ravaged upper
Mid-west, as well as other areas devastated by tornadoes and other
natural calamities. 209 When presented for final congressional ap-

200.
20l.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Congressional process, writing:
The legislative history of the amendment is limited to a single prepassage statement by Representative Conyers indicating that the provision was intended to restore the intangible rights doctrine. See 134
CONGo REc. Hll108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (explaining that
amendment "restores the mail fraud provision to where [it] was
before the McNally decision" so that, if passed, "it is no longer necessary to determine whether or not the scheme ... involved money or
property"); see also United States V. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 143640 (5th
Cir.) (characterizing legislative history of amendment as inadequate),
reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1167-68 n.196.
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
See id. at 2114.
Id. at 2121-23.
Id. at 1806, 2123.
Id. at 2135.
Id.
Id. at 2135-37.
Id. at 2128.
See id. at 2123.
See Veto of H.R. 1469-1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Recovery from Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts In-
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proval, emergency appropriations for "recovery from natural disasters" and "overseas peacekeeping efforts" were tied to the establishment of a "National Commission on the Cost of Higher
Education"210 and a "State option to issue food stamps to legal immigrants."211 More notable, however, were the engraftments dealing
with controversial subjects, such as a ban on sampling during the
year 2000 decennial census,212 and preventing government shutdowns upon failure to enact funding for the upcoming fiscal year. 213
These controversial adornments were the major reason given for a
presidential veto on June 9, 1997. 214 Coincidentally, this was the day
MCEA was decided.215 A few days after the veto, Congress passed a
disaster relief bill with fewer adornments. This congressional legislative process demonstrates all too well the melange that can arise
when legislation is unconstrained by the one-subject rule.
The absence of anything akin to the one-subject rule allows
Congress to join incongruous items together at the convenience of
legislators with clout. Late in the 1997 Session of Congress, a particularly defining example of congressional maneuvering became public. A plan to reimburse persons acquitted of federal crimes was
"slipped into a $31 billion spending bill that cover[ed] the Justice
Department"216 by "a one paragraph amendment [that was] 'quietly'
put on the appropriations bill. "217 The amendment generated a
fierce media debate about the effect of the novel proposal. 218 At
least one representative, a former law professor, said, "I take a very
dim view of the way this was handled. . . . We shouldn't just ram
something like this through without all of the aspects and nuances. "219 This comment reflects existing attitudes that demonstrate
why the one-subject rule is clearly justified.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

219.

eluding Those in Bosnia, 6 V.S.C.C.C.A. D22.
H.R CONF. REp. No. lO5-19, at 123 (1997).
[d. at 124.
See id.
See HR CONF. REp. No. 105-19, at 123 (1997).
See id.
See Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n v. State, 346 Md. 1, 1, 694 A.2d 937,
937 (1997).
Angie Cannon & David Hess, With Plan to Reimburse Federal Acquittals, Who
Would Pay the Real Price?, WASH. POST, October 19, 1997, at AlO.
[d.
See, e.g., id.; Angie Cannon & David Hess, A Bid to Make U.S. Pay if Prosecutors
Lose, PHlLA. INQUIRER, October 13, 1997, at AI.
Cannon & Hess, supra note 216, at AlO (quoting David E. Skaggs, a Representative from Colorado and former law professor).
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Finding congruity among the disparate items embodied in
these illustrative congressional packages is inconceivable. No such
mixture would be conceptually acceptable under the one-subject
rule. The only connection among these items is their location in a
bill that was sure to pass. They have virtually no interdependent
purpose except for the need of a vehicle to become law. They have
no common denominator. They are surely not horizontally connected, and vertical connection occurs, if at all, only because the
bill might be termed an omnibus vehicle designed to clean out the
legislative stables.
V.

CONCLUSION

The congressional process is no model for Maryland. The congressional process discounts due consideration for separate subjects,
fomenting packages that hide, rather than illume matters. It may be
fervently hoped that the spectacle of the ongoing Congressional process sobers those who would embellish MCEA. The congruous standard ought not become a homogenous standard that ignores Porten
Sullivan and Prince Georgians. The one-subject rule should continue
to be an impediment to legislative excess in Maryland.

